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Abstract
The paper analyzes the excess entry hypothesis for sealed-bid first-
price public procurement auctions.The hypothesis is proved analytically
for any feasible combination of bid preparation cost and bid evaluation
cost when the bidders face a rectangular cost density function and con-
firmed in numerical simulations based on a family of flexible cost density
functions. The excess entry hypothesis implies that the procurer may re-
duce both his own cost and the social cost by imposing a positive fee on
the bids.
Sequential search is a superior strategy to a public procurement auc-
tion whether or not the procurer imposes an optimal fee on the bids.
Keywords: Excess entry, Public procurement auctions, Optimal fee,
Sequential search
JEL codes: D21, D43, D44, L13, L51,
1 Introduction
According to the seminal papers by Mankiw and Whinston 1986 [15] and Suzu-
mura and Kiyono 1987 [20], entry costs may cause the market equilibrium num-
ber of firms to exceed the socially eﬃcient number of firms in oligopolistic mar-
kets for homogeneous final goods.1 Following Suzumura and Kiyono the result
is dubbed the (second-best) excess entry theorem.2
In Mankiw andWhinston’s setting the suﬃcient conditions for this to happen
are: (a) firms face identical cost functions and act symmetrically; (b) total
output increases in the number of firms; (c) the output per firm declines as
the number of firms increases; (d) the postentry (equilibrium) price exceeds
marginal costs.3
1For recent surveys, see Suzumura 2012 [21] and Fujita 2016 [6]
2 Second-best because the social planner is assumed to take oligopolistic pricing as granted
rather than enforcing the marginal-cost principle.
3 In eﬀect, conditions (b) to (d) say that the demand function is declining and that the
individual firm’s producer’s surplus in insuﬃcient to cover its total costs (inclusive fixed costs)
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The hypothesis analyzed in this paper is that the excess entry theorem also
holds in the case of ordinary sealed-bid first-price public procurement auctions
under similarly, in this case seemingly innocuous, conditions: (a’) firms face
the same ex ante cost density function and act symmetrically; (b’) the expected
winning bid decreases in the number of bidders; (c’) the bidders’ expected profit
declines as the number of bidders increases; (d’) the winning bid exceeds the
winning bidder’s cost. The analytical problem is that in the case of a public pro-
curement auction there are no simple analogies to the market demand function
and the producers cost function in the ordinary goods market.
The excess entry theorem is of little practical relevance in ordinary goods
markets because, in general, it is not feasible to reduce the number of firms to
the socially eﬃcient number without raising the price of the good and harm-
ing consumers. On the contrary, in public procurement auctions the procurer
may appropriate the eﬃciency gain and reduce both private and social costs by
imposing a fee on the bids. The analysis indicates that the potential saving is
significant.
An ordinary public procurement auction is just one way of organizing pro-
curement. An alternative is sequential search. In sequential search (as defined in
this paper), the procurer is supposed to peg a price and ask a randomly selected
potential bidder if he will accept the oﬀer. If the supplier addressed declines,
the procurer continues until he finds a supplier that accepts. The price oﬀered
must be suﬃciently high to induce the supplier to pay bid preparation costs
and learn his production costs. As shown below, sequential search is a supe-
rior search strategy to a public procurement auction. This finding is consistent
with the empirical fact that private sector procurers, who are free to choose the
mode of contract they find most suitable, make little use of public procurement
auctions (literature referred to below).
The present analysis is deliberately made as simple as possible. It falls
within the independent private value paradigm and is restricted to the case of
perfect symmetry. Potential bidders are assumed not to know their production
cost before they have paid a common (sunk) bid preparation cost and entry
fee, if any. However, they (and the procurer) know the (common, restricted)
cost density function. These assumptions imply that each bidder’s price is a
monotonically increasing function of his production cost; that any potential
bidder that has decided to pay the bid preparation cost and the entry fee, if
any, also submits a bid even if his realized cost and price may be high and his
probability of winning be correspondingly low; and that the bidder that realizes
the lowest production cost also oﬀers the lowest price, wins the auction and (in
market equilibrium) earns a profit equal to the bid preparation cost paid by his
competitors.
if the price equals marginal costs and, consequently, that the second-best (market equilibrium)
solution is inferior to the (infeasible) first-best solution. In technical terms, the cost function
satisfies (i) 0 ()  0 for all   0, (ii) either  (0)  0 or lim→0+ 00 () := 00 (0)  0 and
(iii) 00 ()   · 0

 + 6= 

, where  is the i-th firm’s output,  the market price,
and  the coeﬃcient of conjectural variations,  =  ( = 1 ) 2  ) (Suzumura and
Kiyono 1987) [20]
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For simplicity, I assume that the procurer determines the number of bidders
that are invited to submit bids and that this number (≥ 2) is made known to the
bidders. The number of invited bidders is determined as the number of bidders
consistent with the condition that the bidders’ ex ante expected profit is non-
negative. These assumptions ensure that the invited bidders will actually bid,
and that no bid exceeds the cost density function’s upper support. The outcome
of the game is defined in terms of (i) the market equilibrium number of bidders
and the associated expected private and social costs, (ii) the eﬃcient number
of bidders and the associated expected private and social costs, and (iii) the
optimum (cost-minimizing) fee.
As to public procurement auctions the paper relates to Riley and Samuelson
1981 [17] (as to the derivation of the bid function) and to Samuelson 1985 [18]
(as to the impact of bid preparation costs on the eﬃcient number of bidders).
A crucial diﬀerence is that Samuelson assumes that the bidders know their
costs before incurring bid preparation costs and, consequently, only pay bid
preparation costs and submit a bid if their production cost is below a certain
value (increasing in the entry cost and number of competitors), which makes the
supplier indiﬀerent between accepting the invitation or abstaining. The analysis
of the relation between entry costs and the optimal entry fee has a parallel in
French and McComick 1984 [5], although their model diﬀers significantly from
this one.
McAfee and McMillan 1988 [14] analyze the sequential direct search mech-
anism introduced by Stigler in his seminal paper on the economics of informa-
tion [19]. In their paper, the imperfection is solely due to the procurer’s cost
of searching for potential suppliers: The procurer continues searching until the
search cost exceeds the expected gain from addressing one more potential sup-
plier. Providers’ bid preparation cost is implicitly assumed of no significance. In
my setting, the most important factor is the providers’ (bid preparation) cost;
consequently, the price oﬀered must be suﬃciently high to make it worthwhile
for potential providers to consider the oﬀer.
In section 2, I develop the general setup. However, the general model does
not to allow me to derive conclusions regarding the eﬃciency of public procure-
ment auctions. The pivotal element is the cost density function. In section 3,
I solve the model analytically under the mathematically simplifying assump-
tion that the cost density function is rectangular. In section 4, I solve the
model numerically for a family of trigonometric (multi-humped) density func-
tions. I select his family of density functions because the one-humped density
function looks very much like the normal density function (and satisfies the
essential condition of being bounded by a lower and a upper support), the two-
humped density functions may be considered an approximation to the case in
which the bidders (randomly) fall in two groups (low and high costs), and the
many-humped density function approximates the discontinuous version of the
rectangular density function. Numerical solutions based on other mathematical
specifications of the density function (not reported here) do not qualitatively
aﬀect the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
3
2 The general setup
2.1 Strategic games
In the following, I consider and compare two procurement strategies: (i) public
procurement auction and (ii) sequential search.
The time line in the public procurement auction case is as follows: At time
0 the procurer invites  potential bidders to request a description of the project
in question4. The access to the tender documents may depend on their paying
a fee, . The potential bidders are informed of the number of rivals. The
number of invited potential bidders, , and the fee,  if any, are determined
by the procurer on basis on his ex ante information of the potential bidders’
production cost density function,  (), their (common) bid preparation cost,
, and his own bid evaluation cost, , so as to minimize his expected total net
costs. At time 1 each of the invited bidders ’draws’ his production cost, ,
and determines the bid  () that maximizes his expected profit. At time 2 the
procurer ’opens the envelopes’, evaluates the bids and awards the contract to
the bidder, who has submitted the lowest bid.
In the sequential search case, the procurer at time 0 pegs a price, ˆ, and
asks a potential supplier selected at random if he is willing to deliver the project
at that price. The oﬀered price must be suﬃciently high to make it worthwhile
for the supplier to pay the bid preparation cost and learn his production cost
given the probability that his realized cost may be higher than the oﬀered price.
At time 1, the supplier learns his production cost, accepts the oﬀer if his cost
is below the oﬀered price, and declines if his cost exceeds the oﬀered price. In
the latter case, the procurer selects another potential supplier at random and
asks the same question. The game continues until a supplier accepts the oﬀer.
Note that I focus on determining the optimal procurement strategy and,
consequently, on the privately and socially best ex ante expected outcome, which
due to the rationality and information assumptions made is identical to the
optimal equilibrium outcome.
2.2 Derivation of the bid function
Each bidder pegs his bid, , to maximize his expected profit, (Π), given his
production cost, , his bid preparation cost (common to all bidders), , and the
probability that his − 1 competitors have higher realized costs, ( )
4As in most of the literature, it is (unrealistically) assumed that the number of bidders is
continuous. Alternatively, we might assume that the procurer pegs the number of bidders to
the integer just below the estimated market equilibrium number of bidders. A more satisfac-
tory solution to the integer problem is to assume that the buyer issues an open invitation to
suppliers to guage their interest, announces the number of potential (i.e. interested) bidders
and assumes that the potential bidders adopt a common mixed strategy regarding whether
to participate in the auction as in, e.g., Li and Zheng 2009 [11]. However, this solution is less
eﬃcient, as the expected private and social costs are increasing in the number of potential
bidders. See Levin and Smith 1994 [10]
4
(Π) = (− ) ·( )−  (1)
( ) ≡ Pr=[2](  ) = (1−  ())
−1 ;  (c
¯
 ) = 1;  (¯ ) = 0
where c
¯
is the lower support and ¯ is the upper support of the common cost
density function  ().
The first-order profit maximization condition is
(Π)
 = ( ) + (− ) ·  ( ) ·

 = 0
or (as  is a monotonically increasing function of )5

 ·( ) + (− ) ·  ( ) = 0 (2)
The bid function is derived as the solution to eq. (2)

 ·( ) +  ·  ( ) =  ·  ( )
 ( ( ) · )
 =
 ( ( ) · )
 −( )
 ( ) ·  =  ( ) · −
Z
( )
 ( ) = − 1( ) ·
Z
( ) (3)
which, as  (¯ ) = 0, also may be written as
 ( ) = − 1( ) ·
Z 
¯
( ) (4)
2.3 The market equilibrium number of bidders
The ex ante expected lowest cost is
 (1 ()) =
R ¯
c
¯
( ·( ) · ()) R ¯
c
¯
( ) · () =  ·
Z ¯
c
¯
( ·( ) · ())  (5)
5This is a common assumption in the literature; see e.g. Krishna 2009 [9]. A formal proof
is provided in McAfee and McMillan 1987b [13]. The proof is based on two steps: First,
one bidder’s response to a particular decision rule that he arbitrarily conjectures his rivals to
be using. Second, the Nash requirement that the conjecture decision rule is consistent with
optimizing behavior by the other bidders.
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because, by symmetry, each of the  bidders is equally likely to realize the lowest
cost, and consequently, Z ¯
c
¯
( ) · () = 1
The ex ante expected lowest bid is
 (1 ()) =
R ¯
c
¯
³
− 1() ·
R 
¯ ( )
´
( ) · ()R ¯
c
¯
( ) · ()
=  (1 ())−  ·
Z ¯
c
¯
µZ 
¯
( )
¶
· () (6)
and the ex ante expected profit for all  competitors
(Π ()) =  (1 ())− (1 ())−  ·  (7)
=  ·
Z ¯
c
¯
µµ
−
Z 
¯
( )
¶
·  ()
¶
−  ·  (8)
The market equilibrium number of bidders,  (), is the solution to(Π ( )) =
0.
2.4 Social costs and the eﬃcient number of bidders
The expected total social cost is the expected lowest production cost plus the
bidders’ bid preparation cost, , and the procurer’s bid evaluation cost, ,
() = (1 ()) +  · (+ ) (9)
The eﬃcient number of bidders, ∗ , is the solution to 0( ()) = 0.
2.5 Procurer’s cost
The procurer’s total expected cost is
 () = (1 ()) +  ·  (10)
The procurer’s preferred number of bidders, ∗, is the solution to0 ( ()) =
0. The preferred number of bidders may be large, in fact infinite, if the
procurer has no bid evaluation costs. However, the procurer cannot coerce
potential bidders to submit a bid if their ex ante expected profit is negative.
Consequently, the highest feasible number of bidders is  and the associ-
ated lowest feasible cost in the case of ordinary public procurement auctions is
 ( ()) =  ( ()).
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2.6 Sequential search
An alternative to a public procurement auction is to peg a price, ˆ, select a
potential supplier at random and ask whether he is willing to deliver at that
price. The procurer’s cost of finding and addressing a potential supplier is ˆ
The search cost ˆ may diﬀer from the bid evaluation cost in public procurement
auctions, . However, for simplicity, in the following I shall assume that ˆ = 
If the supplier declines after having learned his production cost, the procurer
moves to the next supplier and repeats the process, until a finds one that accepts
the oﬀer.
The procurer’s expected cost is
(ˆ) = ˆ+ (ˆ) · ˆ (11)
where  (ˆ) is the expected number of potential suppliers he must address before
he finds one that realizes a cost below the price oﬀered,  ≤ ˆ. The probability
Pr
³
 ≤ ˆ
´
= 
³
ˆ
´
, and the expected number of trials is  (ˆ1) = 1 (ˆ) .
The unrestricted cost-minimizing oﬀered price6 is the solution to
(ˆ
³
ˆ
´
)
ˆ = 1−
(ˆ)
 (ˆ)2 · ˆ = 0
 (ˆ)2
(ˆ) = ˆ (12)
However, if ˆ is low, then the potential suppliers’ expected profit may be
negative. If so, they will abstain from considering the oﬀer, and the procurer
must oﬀer ˆ  ˆ The restricted oﬀered price ˆ is the solution to 
³
Πˆ
³
ˆ
´´
=
0,

³
Πˆ
³
ˆ
´´
=
³
ˆ− (ˆ)
´
·  (ˆ)− 
=
⎛
⎝ˆ−
R ˆ
0
( ·  ()) R ˆ
0
 () 
⎞
⎠ ·  (ˆ)− 
= ˆ ·  (ˆ)−
Z ˆ
0
( ·  ()) −  (13)
The expected private costs and expected social costs are identical

³
ˆ
´
= ˆ + ˆ · ˆ = 
³
ˆ
´
= 
³
ˆ
³
ˆ
´´
+ ˆ · (+ ˆ) (14)
as 
³
Πˆ
³
ˆ
´´
= 0
6The subscript u denotes unrestricted and the subscript restricted.
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I want to compare the social outcomes of the three procurement strategies:
(a) ordinary procurement auction, (b) procurement auction cum optimal fee,
and (c) sequential search. However, to do so I need to specify the cost density
function.
3 Rectangular cost density function
To compare the social outcomes of the three procurement strategies considered:
(a) an ordinary procurement auction, (b) a procurement auction cum optimal
fee, and (c) sequential search, I need to specify the cost density function.
For simplicity and with no loss of generality I assume that c
¯
= 0 and ¯ = 1
and, consequently, that the spread  = ¯− c
¯
is normalized to 1. With this
normalization I obtain
 () = 1;  () = ; ( ) = (1− )−1 ;
Z
( ) = −1 · (1− )

3.1 Public procurement auctions
The bid function reduces to
 ( ) = 1 +
− 1
 ·  (15)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
c
b
(); = (2 3 5 10)
Figure 1: The bid function, rectangular cost density function
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The expected lowest cost and lowest bid are, respectively,
 (1 ()) =  ·
Z 1
0
³
 · (1− )−1 · 1
´

=  ·
µ
1
 −
1
+ 1
¶
=
1
+ 1
 ( ( )) = 1 +
− 1
 · (1 ())
=
1
 +
− 1
 ·
1
+ 1 =
2
+ 1
The zero-profit restriction
 (Π ( )) =  ( ( ))− (1 ( ))−  ·  = 1+ 1 −  ·  = 0
implies that the market equilibrium number of bidders is
 =
r
1
4
+
1
 −
1
2
(16)
The total expected social cost is
( ()) = (1) +  · (+ ) = 1+ 1 +  · (+ ) (17)
The corresponding eﬃcient (cost-minimizing) number of bidders and mini-
mum social cost are
∗ =
r
1
+  − 1 (18)
(∗ (∗)) = 2 ·
√+  − (+ ) (19)
Comparing equations 16 and 18, respectively 17 and 19, implies
Proposition 1 If the cost density function,  (), is rectangular, then the excess
entry hypothesis
  ∗
( ())  (∗ (∗))
holds true for any feasible7 , non-negative values of the bid preparation cost, 
and the bid evaluation cost, .
7The condition for the existence of a competitive market solution,  ≥ 2, is  ≤ 16 .
Hence, the model implies that the number of public procurement auctions is likely to be
rather small. If the spread is narrow compared to the bidders’ bid preparation cost, there
may be no or only one bidder. The condition for an eﬃcient market solution, ∗ ≥ 2, is
stricter, +  ≤ 1
9
.
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The excess entry hypothesis implies that it is profitable for the procurer to
reduce the number of bidders by imposing a positive fee, , on the bidders. The
optimal fee, ∗, is derived from the zero expected profit condition:
 (Π (∗  (+ ))) = 1∗ + 1 − 
∗ · (+ ∗) = 0
∗ = 1
(∗ + 1) · ∗ − 
=
 +  ·√+ 
1−√+   0
Proposition 2 If  () is rectangular, then the procurer may reduce both private
and social costs by imposing an optimal fee, ∗ on the bidders. The optimal fee
is positive for any feasible non-negative values of bid preparation cost,  and
bid evaluation cost, , and is increasing in both  and .
Figure 2 illustrates the solution of the model for various combinations of bid
preparation cost, , and bid evaluation cost, . The curves depict (from above)
the procurer’s expected cost,  ( ()), the expected social cost,  ( ()),
and the bidders’ expected profit,  (Π ()), as functions of . In all three cases,
the sum of bid preparation cost and bid evaluation cost is identical, + = 0075,
and, consequently, so is the expected social cost.
The market equilibrium solution  ( ()) =  ( ()) is marked by
a dot, the eﬃcient solution  ( (∗)) =  ( (∗  ∗)) is marked by a circle,
and the procurer’s preferred solution  ( (∗)) (infeasible if ∗  ) is
marked by a box. The crosses indicate the expected number of searches and the
resulting expected total cost if the procurer adopts a sequential search strategy.
The derivation is given below.
2 4 6 8 10
0.0
0.5
1.0
n
a:  = 0075;  = 0
2 4 6 8 10
0.0
0.5
1.0
n
b:  = 005;  = 0025
2 4 6 8 10
0.0
0.5
1.0
n
c:  = 0025;  = 005
Figure 2: Solution of the model for various combinations of  and .
Rectangular cost density function
Figure 2a illustrates the case in which the bidders’ bid preparation costs are
relatively high and the procurer pays no bid evaluation cost,  = 0075  = 0.
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In this case the market equilibrium number of bidders is  = 319 and only
somewhat higher than the eﬃcient number of bidders, ∗ = 265. As  = 0, the
procurer would like to see many more bidders, in fact ∗ → ∞. It is natural
to conjecture that the procurer in this case might benefit from subsidizing the
bidders, thereby attracting more bidders, intensifying the competition among
the bidders and reducing his cost. This conjecture is erroneous. On the contrary,
the optimal strategy is to impose a fee, ∗ = 0028 on the bidders. The fee
will, of course, reduce the number of bidders and raise the lowest expected bid,
however by less than the fees collected (the move from the solution indicated by
a dot to the solution indicated by a circle). Figure 2b illustrates the standard
case, i.e., the bid evaluation costs are positive but significantly smaller than the
bid preparation costs,  = 005  = 0025. The overall picture is very much the
same as in figure 2a. The market equilibrium number of bidders is higher, as
is the potential cost reduction by imposing a (higher) optimum fee, ∗ = 0053.
Figure 2c illustrates the unlikely case,  = 2· = 005. In this case, ∗ = 0078 is
quite high, as is the gain, ( ())−( (∗)) = 011. Notice that in this
case the number of bidders that minimizes the procurer’s expected costs is less
than the market equilibrium number of bidders, ∗  , and consequently,
the procurer may reduce his cost (marginally) by directly limiting the number
of bidders. However, it is more profitable to indirectly reduce the number of
bidders by imposing a (high) fee on the bids.
3.2 Sequential search
In sequential search, the procurer pegs a price, ˆ, and asks a randomly selected
potential supplier whether he is willing to deliver at that price. If not, the
procurer moves on to the next potential supplier and repeats the process, until
his oﬀer is accepted.
The procurer’s expected cost is

³
ˆ
´
= ˆ+ (ˆ) · ˆ = ˆ+ 1

³
ˆ
´ · ˆ = ˆ+ 1ˆ · ˆ
The unrestricted optimal oﬀered price, ˆ, is the solution to

³
ˆ
³
ˆ
´´
ˆ =

³
ˆ+ ˆˆ
´
ˆ = 0
from which
ˆ =
√ˆ and  (ˆ) = 1
³
ˆ
´ = 1ˆ = 1√ˆ
Provided a potential supplier realizes production cost ˆ1 ≤ ˆ, then his ex-
pected production cost is
 (ˆ1) =
R ˆ
0
R ˆ
0

=
1
2
· ˆ =
√ˆ
2
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The expected costs to the procurer and society and the suppliers’ expected
profit are, respectively,

³
ˆ
³
ˆ
´´
= ˆ + (ˆ) · ˆ =
√ˆ + ˆ√ˆ

³
ˆ
³
ˆ
´´
=  (ˆ1) + (ˆ) · (+ ˆ) =
√ˆ
2
+
+ ˆ√ˆ

³
Πˆ
³
ˆ
´´
=
³
ˆ − (ˆ1)
´
− (ˆ) ·  =
√ˆ
2
− √ˆ  0 iﬀ ˆ ≥ 2 · 
The non-negative profit restriction implies that  is only feasible in the un-
likely case that the procurer’s cost of finding and addressing a potential supplier,
ˆ, is more than twice the supplier’s cost of calculating his production cost, .
In the ’normal’ case, ˆ ≤ 2 ·  the procurer must oﬀer    to attract
potential suppliers.
The oﬀered price,  is the solution to

³
Πˆ
´
=
³
ˆ− (ˆ1)
´
− (ˆ) · 
=
µ
ˆ− 1
2
· ˆ
¶
− 1ˆ ·  = 0
from which
ˆ =
√
2
 (ˆ) = 1ˆ =
1√
2
3.3

³
ˆ(ˆ)
´
= 
³
ˆ(ˆ)
´
= ˆ+ (ˆ)·ˆ =
√
2+ ˆ√
2 =
2+ √
2
Comparing the three procurement strategies
The isocost functions  ( ( )) related to the three procurement strategies
are, respectively,
(∗) = 1³q
1
+ − 1
´
+ 1
+
Ãr
1
+  − 1
!
· (+ ) = 
( ()) = 1³q
1
4 +
1
 − 12
´
+ 1
+
Ãr
1
4
+
1
 −
1
2
!
· (+ ) = 

³
ˆ
³
ˆ
´´
=
√ˆ
2
+
+ ˆ√ˆ =  ∧
³
ˆ(ˆ)
´
=
√
2+ ˆ√
2 = 
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where  is any feasible cost.
The isocost functions for  = 05 are shown in figure 3.8
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Figure 3: Isocost curves for diﬀerent procurement strategies
The thick downward-sloping line depicts the combinations of  and  for
which the socially eﬃcient solution (∗ (+ )) = ( ( (+ ∗)  + )) =. The thin curved solid line depicts the combinations for which the market
solution ( ( ()  + )) = , if  = 0 Any point on curved line is to
the left of the thick line indicating that the market equilibrium is inferior to the
socially eﬃcient equilibrium, as lower values of  and  result in the same total
social cost, . The broken curves depict the combinations of  and  for which,
respectively, 
³
ˆ
³
ˆ (ˆ)  + 
´´
=  and 
³
ˆ(ˆ ()  + )
´
= . If
 ≤ ˆ2 , the optimal search strategy is to oﬀer ˆ, and if  ≥ ˆ2 the optimal
8The corresponding  ()-functions are
(∗) :  = 0085786− 
( ()) :  =



1
4(05)−8

4 + (05)

(05) +

−8 + 2 (05)  + (05)2 + 2

− (05)  − 2 (05)2


− 1
4(05)−8

−4 − (05)

(05)−

−8 + 2 (05)  + (05)2 + 2

+ (05)  + 2 (05)2






ˆ

ˆ

:  = (05)√ − 3
2



ˆ(ˆ)

:  =



− 1
2
 − 1
4
(05)

−4 + (05)2 + 1
4
(05)2 
− 1
2
 + 1
4
(05)

−4 + (05)2 + 1
4
(05)2



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strategy is to oﬀer ˆ. In both cases, any combination of  and  is to the right
of the (∗) line. This fact implies that sequential search as search strategy is
superior to a socially eﬃcient public procurement auction (an auction where the
procurer imposes an optimal fee), as total costs,  are the same even though
bid preparation cost, , and bid evaluation cost, , are higher.
Proposition 3 If  () is rectangular, then sequential search is a superior strat-
egy to a public procurement auction for any feasible non-negative combination
of bid preparation cost,  and bid evaluation cost, .
Qualitatively, the broken isocost curves illustrating the sequential search
strategy must have the same shapes regardless of the cost density function.
At the origin, ( = 0  = 0)  searching costs nothing and ˆ → ∞. A slight
increase in ˆ reduces the optimal number of searches leaving a relatively con-
siderable ’room within the budget’ for an increase in . If ˆ is already rel-
atively high, a further increase will squeeze the budget left for . At some
value of ˆ,  is reduced to zero. That is, 
³
ˆ
³
ˆ (ˆ)  + 
´´
=  must
be shaped as an inverted U along the -axis. Similar reasoning implies that

³
ˆ(ˆ ()  + )
´
=  must have the shape of an inverted U along the
-axis. The two curves must intersect at some point along the line defined by

³
Π
³
ˆ ()  + 
´´
= 0.
These general properties allow us to conclude that if 
³
ˆ
´
  (∗) for
all three combinations of  and  at the thick, solid (∗ (+ )) =  isocost
curve indicated by dots, then sequential search is a superior strategy to public
procurement auction for any feasible combination of  and . That conclusion
holds for any feasible cost density function,  ().9
4 A family of multi-humped density functions
4.1 Public procurement auctions
The cost density function is defined as
 () = 1− cos 2 (20)
where  ≥ 0 is an integer defining the number of humps. The rectangular
distribution is a special case,  = 0.
9 ()  0; (c
¯
= 0) ; (¯) = 1
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Figure 4. Density functions,  = 1 2 10.
The corresponding distribution function, probability function, and bid func-
tion are
 () = − sin 2
2 (21)
 ( ) =
µ
1− + sin 2
2
¶−1
(22)
 ( ) = −
R 
1
³¡
1− + sin 22
¢−1´ ¡
1− + sin 22
¢−1 (23)
The bid functions are depicted in figure 5 below. As →∞, the distribution
function and bid functions approximate the corresponding functions in the case
in which the density function is rectangular.
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0.0
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1.0
 = 1; = [2 3 5]
0.0 0.5 1.0
0.0
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 = 2; = [2 3 5]
0.0 0.5 1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
 = 10; = [2 3 5]
Figure 5 The bid function, trigonometric density function
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The bidders’ total profit and social cost are, respectively,
 (Π ( )) =  ·
Z 1
0
(( ()− ) · ( ) ·  ()) −  ·  (24)
= − ·
Z 1
0
ÃÃZ 
1
Ãµ
1− + sin 2
2
¶−1!

!
· (1− cos 2)
!
−  · 
 ( ( + )) =  ·
Z 1
0
( · ( ) ·  ()) +  · (+ ) (E(CS(tri)))
=  ·
Z 1
0
Ã
 ·
µ
1− + sin 2
2
¶−1
· (1− cos 2)
!
+  · (+ )
As above, the market equilibrium number of bidders,  (), is the solution
to  (Π ( )) = 0. The socially eﬃcient number of bidders, ∗ ( )  is the
solution to ((+)) = 0.
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0.8
n
 = 10
Figure 6. Expected social cost, eﬃcient solution and market equilibrium
The curves in figure 6 depict the expected social cost,  ( ())  for (from
below)  = [0025 005 0 075 01]. The circles indicate the socially eﬃcient
solutions, and the dots indicate the market equilibrium solutions. In all three
cases (and in cases not reported), the circles are to the left of and below the
corresponding dots as the excess entry theorem predicts.
Proposition 4 If the cost density function is trigonometric, then the excess
entry theorem
 ( )  ∗ ( + )
 ( ( ( )))   ( (∗ ( + )))
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holds and, consequently, it is possible to reduce private and social costs by im-
posing a positive fee,  on the bidders,
∗ (  )  0
 ( ( ( + ∗))) =  ( ( ( + ∗))) =  ( (∗ ( + )))
  ( ( ( )))
for any integer number of humps, , and any feasible non-negative combinations
of bid preparation cost,  and bid evaluation cost, .
4.2 Sequential search
The expected number of searches, ˆ, and the procurer’s expected cost are, re-
spectively,
 (ˆ) = 1

³
ˆ
´ = 1ˆ− sin 2ˆ2 (25)

³
ˆ
³
ˆ
´´
= ˆ+ (ˆ) · ˆ (26)
= ˆ+ ˆˆ− sin 2ˆ2
The unrestricted cost-minimizing oﬀered price, ˆ (ˆ), is the solution to
0
³
ˆ
³
ˆ
´´
= 0.
However, the minimum feasible oﬀered price must be suﬃciently high to
make a potential supplier’s expected profit non-negative. The restricted oﬀered
price, ˆ (), is the solution to

³
Πˆ
³
ˆ
´´
=
³
ˆ− (ˆ1)
´
− ˆ · 
=
⎛
⎝ˆ−
R ˆ
0
( · (1− cos 2)) 
ˆ− sin 2ˆ2
⎞
⎠− ˆ− sin 2ˆ2
= 0
In both cases, the expected social cost is

³
ˆ
³
ˆ
´´
=  (ˆ1) + ˆ · (+ ˆ)
=
R ˆ
0
( · (1− cos 2)) 
ˆ− sin 2ˆ2
+
+ ˆ
ˆ− sin 2ˆ2
Figure 7 serves to demonstrate that sequential search is superior to a public
procurement auction.10
10The ten-humped case is not shown, as it is very similar to the rectangular cost density
function.
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Figure 7: The social isocost function and combinations of ˆ and  for which
the procurer’s best strategy is ˆ (ˆ) or ˆ ().
The downward-sloping lines are isocost functions determined by the con-
dition  (∗ ( + )) =  (). The slope of the line is −1. The  () is
the maximum social cost consistent with eﬃcient competitive equilibrium, i.e.
∗ ( + ) = 2 . In the one-humped case, the maximum value of + is 0068,
and in the two-humped case, the value is 010127. The upward-sloping sequences
of crosses delimit the combinations of  and  where ˆ (ˆ) is the optimal search
strategy (below) and ˆ () is the optimal search strategy (above).
As discussed in section 3.3 above, we only need to compare 
³
ˆ
´
and
 (∗) at the three points on the linear  (∗) isocost curves depicted by
dots. In all three cases 
³
ˆ
´
is smaller than  (∗) 11 . Consequently, we
may conclude that sequential search is always a superior strategy to a public
procurement auction cum an optimal (positive) fee, ∗, and more so compared
to a less eﬃcient ordinary public procurement auction.
Proposition 5 If the cost density function,  (), is trigonometric, then se-
quential search is a superior procurement strategy to a public procurement auc-
tion for any integer number of humps, , and feasible non-negative combinations
of,  and ˆ = .
11The numerical results are
 = 1  = 2
 004070 0 006800 006740 0 010127
 002729 006800 0 003387 010127 0
 ∗

0532 6 0532 6 0532 6 0551 7 0551 7 0551 7


ˆ

05301 048870 04962 0494 3 0452 5 0472 9
The first column refers to the acombination of  and , where ˆ = ˆ, the second column
refers to the case where  = 0, and the third column to the case where  = 0.
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Figure 8 illustrates the standard case, i.e.  = 005, and  = 0025
The curved lines depicts the expected social costs,  ( (  + )) for  =
[1 2 10]  The optimal fee, ∗ is the solution to  (Π (∗  ( (+ ∗)))) = 0.
The dots indicate the market equilibrium, the circles indicate the eﬃcient so-
lution, and the diamonds denote the expected social costs, 
³
ˆ
³
ˆ ()
´´
in
the case of sequential search. The vertical lines mark the corresponding values
of  ∗ and ˆ.
1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
n
 = 1; ∗ = 00693
1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
n
 = 2; ∗ = 00563
1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
n
 = 10; ∗ = 00560
Figure 8 Social costs in public procurement auctions and sequential search for
various values of .
5 Conclusion
Under the simplifying assumption that the cost density function is rectangular, I
have analytically proved the excess entry hypothesis for any feasible non-negative
combination of bid preparation cost and bid evaluation cost.
The hypothesis implies
• that an ordinary public procurement auction is an ineﬃcient procurement
strategy and
• that the procurer may reduce his own costs and social costs by imposing
a positive fee on the bids.
In addition I proved
• that sequential search is a superior strategy to a public procurement auc-
tion for any feasible non-negative combination of bid preparation cost and
bid evaluation cost.
I found it not possible to prove analytically that these results hold in general
as the general model implies integrals that have no analytical solution. As an
alternative, I explored the properties of the three procurement strategies by nu-
merically solving the optimization problem for a flexible family of trigonometric
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cost density functions. The simulations confirm the strong results derived an-
alytically in the rectangular case and suggest (but do not prove) that they do
hold in general.12
Although simple, the model conforms well to a number of empirical observa-
tions: (a) The number of bidders in public procurement auctions is often quite
low13, (b) the costs associated with public procurement auctions are relatively
high14, and (c) in general, private sector procurers, who are free to choose the
mode of contract they find most suitable, make little use of public procurement
auctions15.
The model and these empirical observations indicate that public procure-
ment auction, as required by, e.g., EU legislation is an ineﬃcient mode of
contracting and that the sought for transparency, equality of treatment and
economic integration come with a significant cost16 .
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